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Measuring Central Bank 
Independence:  Ordering, Ranking, or 
Scoring?* 
King Banaian 
St. Cloud State University 
Central bank independence (CBI)as an area for international comparison and for 
study by international political economists has been around for approximately two 
decades, spurred on by the work of Bade and Parkin (1982). It probably reached its full 
fruition with the work of Cukierman and others, centering on work done at the World 
Bank. There are others too, and we should not ignore them, but since the mid-1990s most 
of the work done has centered on the Cukierman-type model. 
Interest in the CBI intensified after models of monetary policy found the 
likelihood of an inflationary bias in monetary policy operated by democratic 
governments. That analysis turned on the potential for monetary surprises being 
perpetrated by governments seeking electoral advantage. Later analysis found that if such 
incentives were fully anticipated by the public, inflation rates in democracies are higher 
than they would be if somehow government could make a credible commitment to price 
stability. The search began for how to establish monetary institutions that can be viewed 
as credible commitments. Delegation of monetary policy to an independent central bank 
was one strand of that exploration.  
                                                 
*
 Forthcoming in King Banaian and Bryan W. Roberts Jr., eds, The Design and Use of Political Economy 
Indicators. New York:  Palgrave, 2008.  
 It is also believed that independent central banks would reduce the scope of 
monetization of government budget deficits and thereby put downward pressures on 
deficits. (Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti 1992) argued, 
"Economists and practitioners in the area of monetary policy generally 
believe that the degree of independence of the central bank from other 
parts of government affects the rates of expansion of money and credit 
and, through them, important macroeconomic variables, such as inflation 
and the size of the budget deficit."  
Over time, views of CBI have evolved as our own understanding of institutions 
has. Central bank structures are chosen in a political system that reflects the nature of the 
polity. Forder (1998) points out, for example, that statutory CBI only matters if the law 
conditions behavior. Posen (1993) argues that without a political coalition that wishes to 
have monetary stability, legal independence would not be granted. Banaian and Luksetich 
(2001) show that countries with more economic freedom (particularly those with greater 
security of private property rights) tend to choose central bank structures with greater 
independence. 
Endogeneity issues are only one of the many discussions surrounding the 
measurement of CBI. Political economists have sought measures of these institutional 
arrangements, and while some researchers have used measures such as the turnover of 
central bank governors or survey data, legal independence measures continue to dominate 
the research agenda. These measures tend to focus on relatively large sets of central bank 
attributes rather than deciding which ones are more important. 
In this paper, I first examine what measures are used. My argument is that in the 
search for a measure that can embrace the many possible dimensions of independence we 
have lost sight of why wish to measure CBI. Along the way, we have made decisions 
regarding the scales on which we measure institutional arrangements that are arbitrary 
and atheoretic. An absence of theory also surrounds the decisions of averaging. Some 
measures use simple arithmetic averages while others place weights in ways that are 
difficult to justify by monetary theory. 
In the second half of the paper, I appeal to theory in order to justify using a 
classification scheme that is lexicographic and simplified. Rather than placing central 
banks on a scale, I suggest placing them in broad categories; if a researcher were to 
choose to use an index number that was to be meaningful, one have to choose a ranking a 
priori of which central bank attributes mattered most. It may be that some matter more for 
inflation control, while others matter more for long-run economic growth (by reducing 
uncertainty over monetary policy) or for budget deficit control. My point is not to argue 
for a particular new ranking, though I will offer one. It is that the researcher cannot avoid 
deciding what counts, and why, by using a one-size-fits-all measure of CBI. 
1 Early Measures:  Ranking Central Banks 
Early iterations of the CBI measure centered on two legal characteristics – the 
appointment process for the central bank’s board, and whether or not the central bank 
maintained autonomy for monetary policy or whether the government held a veto. Bade 
and Parkin (1982) created eight classifications by marking three binary choices: 
 Who has final authority for monetary policy? 
 Are a majority of the members of the central bank board appointed 
independently of the government? 
 Is there a government official on the central bank board (whether or not 
she or he is a voting member)? 
All of these are references in one way or another to central bank autonomy. As  
Akhtar (1995) notes, there is no reference to the goals of the central bank, no reference to 
price stability. Bade and Parkin then asserted from this a rank ordering of which 
structures were more independent than others by adding up how many of the three 
choices favored the central bank’s independence. Eijffinger and De Haan (1996) show 
that this is relatively accidental: Only four of the eight possible classifications appeared 
in the industrialized economies:  some had none of the autonomy measures; some had 
only the absence of a government official on the bank board; some had the absence of a 
government official and final authority for monetary policy; and two had all three 
desirable qualities (the Bundesbank and the Swiss National Bank). They thus gave the 
banks scores of one to four. 
Others tried to insert additional criteria. Alesina (1993) adds a fiscal dimension to 
this list:  Are central banks required to purchase Treasury bills?
i  
This is the beginning of 
consideration of the concept of fiscal dominance, or that governments can force even the 
most autonomous central bank to issue base money if it must act as a backstop for debt 
issuance. This would mean that such central banks may not have operational 
independence. A lack of operational independence also accords to central banks that are 
chartered to guard for “financial stability.” As the problems stemming from the subprime 
mortgage crisis and resulting credit crunch made clear, the Federal Reserve has less than 
complete operational independence.
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The Bade-Parkin, Alesina and Eijffinger-Schaling indexes are in fact not cardinal 
in any way.
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They describe four or five separate central bank types, as described by 
these three attributes. All three indexes have some agreement over the order of the bank 
types towards independence. Such ordering is lexicographic:  Central banks that have 
final authority over monetary policy are always ranked ahead of those where the 
government has final authority (or that authority is shared, in the Eijffinger-Schaling 
index) regardless of the appointment process. 
2 Cardinal Measurements:  Cukierman and GMT 
Most CBI indices that researchers use these days involve either some point count 
of various institutional features or some scale determined by a reading of the experts. The 
Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini index would be an example of this type. Their point 
count type index usually uses a yes/no choice for some institutional feature, e.g., is the 
chair of the central bank appointed by the country’s chief executive? Does the 
government have a direct representative like a finance minister on the central bank 
board? Does the central bank’s constitution specify price stability as the sole objective of 
central bank policy? The number of “yes” answers are summed to construct the index.  
Sometimes these get combined with the second, more judgmental index type to get a 
blended measure, as in Alesina and Summers (1993).  
The Cukierman, Webb and Neyapti index is quite different from these earlier 
versions. It is additive of various features, as does the Grilli, Masciandaro and Tabellini 
index. But the CWN index places a much richer set of possible institutional arrangements 
along a variety of scales. Some of them will be two or three-point scales, others as high 
as a seven-point scale. They are then added, sometimes in an unweighted average and 
other times in a weighted average (called LVAU and LVAW in their paper).  For 
example, the conflict resolution variable included in Cukierman is a six-point scale as 
follows: 
1. CB given final authority over issues clearly defined in the law as CB 
objectives.   
2. Government has final authority only over policy issues that have not been 
clearly defined as CB goals in the case of conflict with CB.   
3. In case of conflict, final decision is up to a council whose members are from 
CB, legislative branch and executive branch.   
4. Legislative branch has final authority on policy issues. 
5. Executive has final authority on policy issues, but subject to due process and 
possible protest by CB.   
6. Executive branch has unconditional authority over policy. 
These get marked as 1, 0.8, 0.6, … 0. The authors then take each of these 
measures and collect a set of sub-averages, and then average the sub-averages for either a 
weighted or an unweighted number lying between zero and one that is considered a 
measure of legal central bank independence. 
In Table 1 I have arrayed the various components of the indexes, and shown the 
weights applied to each.  An advantage of the GMT measurements is that the measure is 
an unweighted summation (though as discussed below, it assumes all values are 
equivalent in contributing to independence, without complementarities.)  When broken 
down, the CWN measure has a set of weights that are  
 
Table 1: Weightings in various central bank independence indices 
 
 Bade/Parkin ES 1993 
C92 - 
LVAU 
C92 - 
LVAW 
GMT91 --  
political 
GMT91 -- 
economic 
Term of office of CEO 0.000% 0.000% 3.125% 5.000% 12.500% 0.000% 
Who appoints CEO 0.000% 0.000% 3.125% 5.000% 12.500% 0.000% 
Dismissal provisions 0.000% 0.000% 3.125% 5.000% 0.000% 0.000% 
Can CEO hold another office? 0.000% 0.000% 3.125% 5.000% 0.000% 0.000% 
Other board members appointed by 
someone other than the government 25.000% 33.333% 0.000% 0.000% 12.500% 0.000% 
Board appointment term of office 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 12.500% 0.000% 
Government sits on CB board 25.000% 33.333% 0.000% 0.000% 12.500% 0.000% 
Who forms monetary policy? 0.000% 0.000% 3.125% 3.750% 12.500% 0.000% 
Conflict resolution 25.000% 33.333% 6.250% 7.500% 12.500% 0.000% 
CB advises budget 0.000% 0.000% 3.125% 3.750% 0.000% 0.000% 
CB objectives 25.000% 0.000% 12.500% 15.000% 12.500% 0.000% 
Limits on advances 0.000% 0.000% 12.500% 15.000% 0.000% 14.286% 
Limits on securitized lending 0.000% 0.000% 12.500% 10.000% 0.000% 0.000% 
Who controls terms of lending 0.000% 0.000% 12.500% 10.000% 0.000% 0.000% 
Width of circle of borrowers from CB 0.000% 0.000% 12.500% 5.000% 0.000% 0.000% 
Lending limits 0.000% 0.000% 3.125% 2.500% 0.000% 14.286% 
Maturity limits 0.000% 0.000% 3.125% 2.500% 0.000% 14.286% 
Interest rate limits 0.000% 0.000% 3.125% 2.500% 0.000% 14.286% 
CB prohibited from primary market 0.000% 0.000% 3.125% 2.500% 0.000% 14.286% 
Discount rate set by CB 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 14.286% 
Bank supervision 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 0.000% 14.286% 
       
Sources:   C92, Cukierman (1992, p 379-80)      
GMT -- EconPolicy (1991, pp 368-370)       
Bade and Parkin (1988)       
ES93 -- Eijffinger and Schaling (1993, p.65)      
 
 Another issue with these broader measures is the need for a broader set of 
judgments. In addition, some central bank laws are silent on some measures. For 
example, few of the 34 central bank laws offered Cukierman, Miller and Neyapti (2002) 
enough information to measure all sixteen instruments. In this case, the measure averages 
up the values into the four subcategories and then averages the subaverages in the same 
way as if they had all sixteen measurements of legal independence. 
Further, it is quite difficult to imagine how central banks in transition economies 
could avoid some participation in the government debt markets. There are few countries 
with financial markets active enough to permit full private purchase of government debt. 
In Ukraine, for instance, few banks have the ability to hold any significant portion of the 
government’s debt. The debt “market” is simply the central bank wire, the closed 
network of computers that connect commercial banks with the National Bank of Ukraine. 
The auction of treasury bonds is conducted by the NBU in conjunction with the Ministry 
of Finance. At some points, the NBU has acted as “buyer of last resort” in the 
government debt market because there were no bids available at any interest rate.iv Since 
that debt is dominant as well in the central bank’s portfolio (with the exception of the 
Baltic states with their currency boards), there may be little choice for the central bank 
legislation than to allow some participation in the debt market.  
3 The Linear Scale and Averaging 
The use of linear scales and averaging to create a single number presents two 
issues in measurement.  First, the linear scale introduces the notion that the gap between 
each type of institutional arrangement within a certain measure, such as term of office, 
has an equal effect on independence or on inflation fighting.   
So for example, the conflict resolution variable in CWN implies that every step 
along the path from institutional arrangement 1 to institutional arrangement 6 has the 
same effect, for example, on reducing inflation or on reducing budget deficits.  There’s 
no reason to believe that is true. Banaian and Luksetich (2001) show that only those 
central banks with the most independent of these six structures have had better inflation 
performance. 
This is a very basic insight of econometric analysis. When using categories such 
as those in the conflict resolution variable above, one can agree to the ordering without 
agreeing what the distances between them are. But that is exactly what the CWN and 
CMN later do. The number created by GMT says that two central banks are “equal” in, 
say, political independence if each of them has six of the eight characteristics of 
politically independent central banks. It does not matter which six. And then one is 
tempted to place those numbers in a regression and derive a slope, or a partial derivative. 
I argue the measures are not to be used in that way. The researcher can measure the 
difference in means between inflation rates of countries with central banks of different 
types and gain insight, but the regression coefficient does not reveal anything more 
meaningful.
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As noted earlier, the CWN, CMN and GMT measures also average or add up a set 
of institutional values. GMT is always an unweighted average as shown in Table 1.  The 
other two measures though, because they average subgroups and then average the sub-
averages imply a set of weights. The weights are quite arbitrary. Principal components 
gives much different weights, awards most of the weight on three variables. (See: 
Banaian, Burdekin, and Willett 1998) 
An example will illustrate. CMN extended the index to 34 countries in transition 
from planned to market economies. Their data set gave multiple indicators for eight 
countries that have changed central bank laws since twice since transition began. Of 
those, five have changed towards giving complete final authority over meeting goals 
stated in the central bank law as the central bank’s objectives (Armenia, Kazakhstan, 
Lithuania, Poland and Uzbekistan). The Central Bank of Mongolia already had that 
power in its earlier law. Those countries followed the lead of the Czech Republic, 
Estonia, Hungary, Latvia and Slovakia. So of the 26 countries, 12 now have central banks 
with complete autonomy. Another, Belarus, says that the government can only act against 
the wishes of the CB on those items not in the central bank’s objectives. The remaining 
give the CB little autonomy, subject to either an unchecked parliamentary (5 of 12) or 
executive veto. 
Was the grant of autonomy a wise choice? I look at the data for price depreciation 
(D in their paper, equal to the inverse of 1 plus the average rate of CPI inflation) for the 
latter subperiods, which are defined by CMN based on the date of adoption of central 
bank laws.
vi
 Their data indicate that the countries with complete central bank autonomy 
have an average rate of price depreciation of 17% per year, while those with any other 
form of conflict resolution had an average annual depreciation rate of 37%.  
Of course, the effects of price liberalization may reduce the size of that effect, as 
CMN demonstrate. However, the size of the effect of complete central bank autonomy 
may still be large. To make a good comparison, I have re-run their regression on just the 
post transition periods.
vii
 These regressions may be compared to their Table 3, except for 
not using the pre-transition sub-period.  I then substituted a simple dummy variable that 
equals one if the central bank has complete autonomy (i.e, if CMN find that the “(central 
bank is given final authority over issues clearly defined in the law as CB objectives”, then 
my autonomy variable will equal 1; otherwise it equals zero). 
Table 2: Inflation and CBI in Transition Economies 
Variable Regression 1 Regression 2 Regression 3 Regression 4 
Cumulative 
liberalization index 
–.07307 
(0.05) 
–.08308 
(0.02) 
–.11543 
(0.01) 
–.09477 
(0.01) 
War Dummy –.06471 
(0.39) 
0.07214 
(0.32) 
0.04479 
(0.53) 
0.06371 
(0.36) 
Index of internal 
price liberalization 
–.48445 
(0.19) 
–.45589 
(0.21) 
–.47241 
(0.18) 
–.50993 
(0.15) 
CMN index 
(“LVAW”) 
–.28473 
(0.14) 
 –.33270 
(0.08) 
 
LVAW slope shift 
(for CLI > 4) 
  0.24414 
(0.07) 
 
Central bank 
autonomy 
 –.09679 
(0.11) 
 –.16563 
(0.02) 
Autonomy slope 
shift (for CLI > 4) 
   0.16620 
(0.07) 
Joint signif. of 
central bank measure 
  0.67 0.04 
Adjusted R
2
 .62 .63 .65 .66 
p-values for significance in parentheses.  Sample size = 31 
The results suggest that perhaps the simple measure of central bank autonomy is 
as useful a measure of CBI as the fuller measure CMN employ. This result confirms what 
was found in Banaian, Burdekin and Willett (1995) for industrialized economies. The 
first and third equations replicate the first and fourth columns of their Table 3. The size 
and significance of most coefficients are similar, except for the index for internal price 
liberalization. Like CMN, I see little evidence of significant effects of CBI as measured 
by their LVAW index (the p-value of 0.14 indicates a 14% probability of no 
significance.) The measure of central bank autonomy fares little better. 
In the third and fourth columns I take advantage of CMN’s insight that the 
effectiveness of CBI may depend on creating a price system more like those in the 
industrialized economies, as measured by the cumulative liberalization index (CLI).  
They use a slope dummy which splits the slope of LVAW at a CLI measure greater than 
4.  They used a cut-off at 2, but since this is a cumulative index, it will naturally have 
higher values in later periods. The mean value of CLI for the third sub-period is 3.42 and 
only five countries had values less than 2. In their example, this brings the significance of 
the LVAW measure in total (for a country that has liberalized prices) to about 5-6%.   
CMN expected that CBI would only obtain anti-inflationary effects if the degree 
of price liberalization placed the country’s price system more in line with those in the 
West. Thus, they found that “The coefficients of (CBI) at low levels of cumulative 
liberalization remain insignificant and the coefficient of CLI (which was significant 
before) becomes insignificant at conventional levels, but its sign remains negative…” (p. 
20). My results show just the opposite when one resets the slope shift dummy to occur at 
CLI greater than four. It now appears that the effects of CBI in reducing inflation are 
significant only for countries that have liberalized less. For countries that have CLI > 4, 
the effect of CBI is nil, while the effects of CLI continue to be as strong as in those 
regressions without the slope shift coefficient.   
It might therefore be useful to run a regression with the principal components 
along as CMN have. One may use the principal components and then re-arrange or 
“unscramble” the results to obtain coefficients on the original central bank attributes.viii 
This appears in the next table. I dropped the third principal component (which mostly 
loads the ability of the CB governor to hold another office) as it was insignificant. The 
result of that estimation is that the conflict resolution mechanism in the central bank law 
and the CB’s objectives are significantly correlated with a country’s price depreciation.  
One should approach these results with due caution, however, as they are based on only 
20 central banks for whom full data are available. 
Table 3: Unscrambled Principal Components Analysis of CBI in Transition 
Economies 
Variable Coefficient p-value 
War dummy 0.089 0.34 
Cumulative liberalization index –.111 0.02 
Internal liberalization –.026 0.96 
Principal component 1 0.161 0.10 
Principal component 2 –.115 0.27 
Constant 0.698 0.05 
1. Unscrambled coefficients   
Term of office –.071 0.12 
Dismissal process –.039 0.39 
Governor can hold another office –.008 0.61 
Who formulates monetary policy –.093 0.19 
Who has final authority –.073 0.04 
Participation in budget process –.010 0.73 
Statutory objectives of CB –.187 0.04 
   
Adjusted R-square 0.64  
Standard error 0.118  
Dependent variable is inflation rate.  See Table 2 for more details. 
4 Issues with Other Measures 
Some researchers have used turnover rates for central bank governors as an 
alternative means of testing central bank independence. The problem with this measure 
however is that turnover may be endogenous to economic performance (see de Haan and 
Kooi (2000) or  Dreher, de Haan and Sturm (2006))  Central bank governors may change 
when governments themselves are unstable. And countries with different attitudes 
towards inflation (or more precisely, different dominant interest groups with different 
preferences for inflation) may in fact prefer longer or shorter turns in office. The 
importance of commercial banks would be one example. 
It is somewhat of a stretch then to say that high rates of turnover of a central 
bank’s CEO is evidence for or against independence. Central bank accountability may 
call for a frequent review of performance, while granting high amounts of independence 
in the inter-review period. It would be odd to view these reviews then as political 
interference.  
Evidence on turnover by Cukierman (1992) found two-way causality between 
inflation and turnover. Dreher, Sturm and De Haan (2006) show that CEOs are replaced 
more often when inflation is higher, along with higher degrees of political instability and 
turnover and the election of left-wing governments. Again, the problem arises: Is this a 
measure of independence or accountability? As  Eijffinger and De Haan (1996) note, a 
long term in office may just reflect a subservient central bank governor, while shorter 
terms could mean a central bank governor who stands up to the executive and/or 
legislative branches.  
Cukierman and Webb (1995) try to refine the turnover measure by looking only at 
those changes in central bank CEOs that happen within six months of a change in 
government. Eijffinger and De Haan (1996) argue that this measure may be quite useful 
in developing economies, where weak rule of law may mean the central bank’s legal and 
actual independence differ sharply. 
Other attempts to measure autonomy have met with more success. For example, 
Oatley (1999) finds that when holding labor market structure and policy preferences of 
the government equal, simple measures of autonomy explain inflation outcomes better 
than either the GMT or CWN indices. Likewise, Banaian, Burdekin and Willett (1995) 
find that the absence of a government override of central bank policy outperforms the 
CWN index. 
Fry, Goodhart and Almeida (1998) include the results of a 1996 survey of central 
bankers in developing countries conducted by the Bank of England. Central bankers who 
saw themselves as more autonomous did not finance government deficits through the 
inflation tax or by financial repression. Cobham, Cosci and Mattesini (2005), studying 
the central banks of France, Italy and the United Kingdom, rely on a different set of 
measures of informal CBI, defined as a central bank being able to pursue price stability 
when it is not the central bank’s goal and without regard to government’s preferences. 
They look at seven attributes, none of which refers to a legal document. The resulting 
ranking is very subjective and while interesting, the paper has so far not attracted much 
attention. 
5 Back to the Future:  A new Lexicography of Central Banks. 
Thus it appears from this analysis that the two or three most important factors in 
determining which central bank de jure features help reduce inflation are the CB’s focus 
on price stability and whether or not it has final authority in setting monetary policy. My 
strategy is to use that feature to return to a model such as Eijffinger and Schaling (1993). 
However, to do so requires a few adjustments to their process. 
First, as central banks have focused on inflation targeting, many elements of 
political autonomy for central banks have ceased to have much variation between them. 
Arnone, Laurens and Segalotto (2006a) recoding of the GMT index in the OECD 
countries finds that only four countries have no provided legal protections to CBs to 
strengthen them in case of conflict with government. But these three of these four 
countries – Australia, Canada, and New Zealand – use an inflation target which is enacted 
by legislation or otherwise imposed by government. The same was true of the United 
Kingdom when inflation targeting was first introduced in 1993; the Bank of England 
gained independence only in 1997 after the election of the Blair government. Many 
countries in the OECD also placed greater emphasis in their laws on price stability. This 
and longer terms for CB governors constitutes a great amount of the improvement in 
political autonomy in OECD central banks since 1990. 
This means two things. First, as noted by Arnone, Laurens and Segalotto (2006a), 
if the researcher uses a GMT index for central banks today, there’s less variation for the 
OECD countries. The EMU countries all score eight of eight marks for political 
autonomy, and Switzerland has moved to seven of eight from the five it scored in the 
original coding by GMT. Second, the GMT index as recoded by Arnone et al. (2006a) 
gives four of the five lowest marks to the four Anglospheric central banks, which have 
inflation targeting imposed by legislation or by approval of the government. (The three 
remaining banks are Denmark, Japan and the USA.) Among emerging market economies, 
there is more heterogeneity in terms of conflict resolution, but only the South African 
Reserve Bank does not have inflation in its charter as its primary objective. Yet it adopted 
an inflation-targeting rule in 2000 (for details of its relation to the government see van 
der Merwe (2004)).
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Arnone et al. (2007) review the evidence on central bank independence and draw 
four “consensus views” of monetary policymakers from global trends. 
1. “Set price stability as the primary objective of monetary policy.” The 
time-inconsistency argument for inflationary bias in democratic countries 
has led to broad agreement on the establishment of price stability as the 
sole goal as part of a credible commitment. 
2. “Curtail direct lending to governments.” Consensus has formed among 
central bankers that any lending to government should be temporary, 
restricted by amount and subject to market rates of interest.   
3. “Ensure full autonomy for setting the policy rate.” This implies both 
instrument independence (in the sense of Debelle and Fisher (1995)) and a 
consensus that a short-term interest rate is the best operational target for 
monetary policy. 
4. “Ensure no government involvement in policy formulation.” There should 
be no veto by government in the decisions, and the structure of central 
bank laws should strengthen the position of the central bank when 
conflicts arise with the government.  
I argue that this list constitutes an effective set of categories for classification of 
central banks. Rather than develop a new system of weights and steps, the method I 
propose takes these four consensus views and creates a category indicating which of 
these each country’s central bank has adopted, along the lines of  Eijffinger and Schaling 
(1993) and Schaling (1995, chapter 3), who create eight potential central bank structures 
but discover only five of the eight were adopted by any of the central banks of the OECD 
countries. 
Arnone et al. (2007) argue for a sequencing of reforms in which goals and basic 
autonomy of the central bank (in particular instrument independence) would come before 
the imposition of limits on central bank lending to government. In developing economies, 
central bank participation in government debt markets may help in countries with shallow 
money markets. Governments would demonstrate that direct lending is curtailed if they 
make their central bank completely autonomous. As noted in Banaian, Burdekin and 
Willett (1995, 1998), direct lending does not provide any further explanation of inflation 
control in either developing or industrialized economies once autonomy is accounted for.  
Therefore, in the following discussion, I do not account for it.
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All three of the remaining criteria are political variables. Both the CWN and GMT 
indices measure these, and Arnone et al. update those measurements for newer central 
bank charters. As GMT uses a simple 0-1 measure it would seem easy to use their 
measurements, but there remains the question of drawing the lines in converting them as 
Arnone et al. do. They consider the price stability objective criterion to be met in cases 
where price stability is mentioned with other goals, even those that would “potentially 
conflict” with price stability. This is quite outside the consensus view they claim.xi In the 
case of many laws governing central banks in the EU, laws are worded to state that price 
stability is the primary objective of monetary policy and task of the central bank, and then 
say “without prejudice to its primary objective”, the central bank can support 
macroeconomic policies of the government. In this case, I believe the subsidiary of full 
employment or other objectives is sufficiently clear to fit the consensus, and I treat those 
central banks as if they had a sole objective. 
A very important consideration in this would be whether objectives for financial 
stability in a central bank charter conflict with price stability, when those are the only two 
objectives listed in the law.  In the ECB law makes it quite clear that financial stability is 
secondary to price stability, but in central bank laws of countries where central banks are 
said to have a great deal of autonomy – such as the Reserve Bank of New Zealand, the 
Bank of Canada, or the Riksbank – financial stability is provided more as a constraint on 
pursuit of price stability.
xii 
It is quite true, as Ferguson (2002) points out, that if the 
central bank does not produce price stability it will get financial instability, as 
expectations for macroeconomic outcomes are not met. But the question remains whether 
the reverse is true:  can one have financial instability when the central bank is producing 
price stability, and if so, does financial instability then threaten price stability? Ferguson 
argues that it is not a question of whether one ignores financial stability in that case, but 
what weight one places on it. It is still a very open question, but in the classification that 
follows, I will treat financial stability as being consistent with price stability. 
Also, for strengthening the hand of the central bank in conflicts with the 
government, Arnone et al. use a curious recoding of the CWN measure to say the hand is 
strengthened either if there is a conflict resolution by committee of the central bank, 
executive and legislature, or if conflicts are decided by the legislature alone. Certainly, in 
the second case this cannot be considered removing political interference from central 
bank policy. I argue that in a negotiation with the central bank, parliaments and 
presidents will hold a great deal of sway and make it difficult for the central bank to hold 
onto the conflicting policy. There are arguments for the central bank having more 
autonomy; the more transparent is the veto of the legislature or executive. I will 
nonetheless argue for a very clear autonomy, and thus the only veto that will be seen as 
still permitting a strong central bank hand in conflicts will be provisions that only allow 
for veto over matters not defined as the bank’s primary objective – that is, if the central 
bank has a sole objective of price stability but wanted to build new, ornate branch offices, 
the government could object to that.  Just not the bank’s pursuit of price stability.xiii 
In Table 4 I show these classifications for the OECD banks in 1993 and 2006.
xiv 
The data reveal the broad movement of central banking towards this consensus view. 
Every central bank listed has moved towards what theory would state is a better central 
bank structure in the last twenty years except Switzerland and the USA, both of which 
started with very good structures.
xv 
All central banks that had none of the three desired 
central bank attributes in the consensus view have changed their laws to take at least one 
of them, and all have made price stability one of monetary policy’s objectives if not the 
only one. In developing countries, a broad majority follow this advice. Mahadeva and 
Sterne (2000) found in a survey of 94 central banks that 26% had only monetary stability 
as a goal, while another 57% had monetary policy and other goals that did not compete 
with that goal, such as financial stability or stability of the payments system. 
Most of the countries that have retained a government override do so within a 
framework of inflation targeting. In these cases the government has made the 
commitment to the inflation targeting regime and assigned the central bank the task of 
meeting that objective. Many developing and emerging-market economies have also 
chosen this path.  It may be in this case that this method provides some accountability to 
government of reducing pressures from fiscal deficits. Australia is an interesting case 
insofar as it retains (in Section 10 of the Reserve Bank Act of 1959) both the goal of 
providing for “the stability of the currency of Australia” and to “(maintain) full 
employment in Australia.” The consensus view would find this one step below the 
independence of the other government-adopted inflation targeters in the OECD. 
In a strong sense, there is a parallel between these central banks and the pre-ECB 
Nederlandsche Bank. As Burdekin and Willet (1991) argue, the Dutch government could 
provide for an override of the bank’s policy, but had to do so by an open directive that 
was laid before the parliament, with an explanation. Likewise, these inflation targeting 
central banks are under the control of government, but the government has to argue 
openly why their override is consistent with the agreed inflation target. Governments 
cannot use the central banks as scapegoats for a failed macroeconomic policy when they 
have a veto over policy.   
It is tempting to place the central banks listed here on a scale, much as Alesina or 
Eijffinger and Schaling did using a similar strategy fifteen years or more ago. But, the 
nature of the differences in the scale would now be very different. The difference 
between the two most independent structures that we actually observe is over the 
possibility that the Federal Reserve and the Swiss National Bank are less inflation-averse 
because of their dual mandates. But Meyer (2001) points out that the sole goal of the 
ECB may not mean a zero weight on output variability from full employment.xvi I do not 
think we have yet enough data on the ECB to determine whether it has a weight on output 
variability greater than zero.  Likewise, it is worth considering whether the step between 
Japan and Australia is the same as between Australia and the other inflation targeters 
(outside of the ECB or Mexico.) It is, however, quite reasonable to treat the Fed, SNB, 
the ECB and the Bank of Mexico as qualitatively more independent than those where the 
government has an override (even when providing accountability through an inflation 
targeting program.) As argued earlier in this paper, ordinal rankings make some sense but 
cardinal values do not. 
6 Conclusions 
It is more contentious to use the classification scheme described here, but it has 
precedent. The IMF (2006) classifies exchange rate regimes into eight categories, and 
monetary policy frameworks into five possible structures, without placing any numbers 
on them.  Levy-Yeyati and Sturzenegger (2003) use cluster analysis to classify exchange 
rate regimes and frameworks. A cluster analysis uses a type of discriminant analysis that 
seeks groupings as I have in this paper, and chooses each central bank as part of a cluster 
depending on the similarity of experiences with some macroeconomic target.  For 
exchange rate regimes, the variances of the exchange rate and of the change of the 
exchange rate are chosen.   
If one wanted to move from a de jure measure of central bank independence to a 
de facto measure, this would seem the path to take. The exchange rate classification uses 
theorized outcomes of exchange rate behavior to make the classification. Is the central 
bank’s structure or its legal mandate the only determinants of, say, price level variability? 
If one wanted to include fiscal dominance, should budget deficit or government debt 
ratios (to GDP) be included as a criterion for grouping?   
Instead, I have argued for a return to a simpler measure of central bank 
independence that uses the coalescing of professional opinion in research since the 
development of these measures fifteen years ago.  By focusing on the price stability 
mandate, instrument independence and the conflict resolution mechanism, I find that a 
group of banks led by the ECB have moved ahead of the Federal Reserve and Swiss 
National Bank.  Using those criteria keeps the Fed and SNB ahead of the countries whose 
governments have imposed an inflation target on their central banks.    
Most importantly, I argue that central bank independence needs to be thought of 
as a set of categories, not a continuous variable.  While the latter is tempting for the 
purposes of statistical analysis, the process of creating continuous variables leads to 
problems in interpretation, and these problems are not solved by computing better.  The 
method used instead is quite arbitrary, in particular the ordering of which criterion goes 
first.  I believe it is better to make the choice and do so explicitly than to provide any 
sense of evenhandedness or numerical certainty through an aggregation scheme. 
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8 APPENDIX  
Table 4.  Classification of OECD Central Banks  
Prototype 
Government 
override? 
Price 
stability 
objective? 
Instrument 
independence 
Exists 
1989? Exists 2007? 1989 Examples 2007 Examples 
a YES None NO YES NO 
Belgium, Canada, 
France, United 
Kingdom, Japan, 
Korea, Mexico, 
Norway, New 
Zealand, Poland, 
Sweden  
b YES None YES NO NO   
c YES Multiple NO YES YES 
Australia, 
Hungary, Iceland, 
Spain Japan 
d YES Multiple YES NO YES  Australia 
e YES Sole NO YES YES 
Finland, Greece, 
Ireland, 
Netherlands 
Canada, Korea, 
Norway, New 
Zealand, United 
Kingdom 
f YES Sole YES NO NO   
g NO None NO NO NO   
h NO None YES NO NO   
i NO Multiple NO YES NO Denmark  
j NO Multiple YES YES YES USA, Switzerland USA, Switzerland 
k NO Sole NO NO NO   
l NO Sole YES YES YES Germany 
ECB and its 
membership (incl. 
associates), 
Mexico 
Source:  1989 from Cukierman [1992].  2007 by author, from BIS [2007] collection of central bank laws   
                                                  
i
 As Schaling (1995) notes, this is not a direct criterion applied but implied in the discussion of the 
“divorzio” of the Banca d’Italia from absorbing the excess supply of Treasury securities. See also Tabellini 
(1988).   
ii
 Buiter (2006) refers to complete operational independence as equivalent to a lack of substantive 
accountability.  There is no judgment or consequence for a central bank that, acting as a delegate of 
authority from the people and/or the government, suffers when its actions are not desired by those 
principals.   
It is not surprising that truly operationally independent central banks have effectively no 
substantive accountability at all. Independence has to mean that those in charge of monetary policy cannot 
be fired except for incapacity or serious misconduct, and that financial remuneration and working 
conditions likewise cannot be used to reward or punish them. (pp. 23-24) 
iii
 I say this despite the fact that Alesina goes so far as to classify the Bank of Italy with a 
fractional number.  That is clearly a judgment meant to indicate that he thought there was some difference 
between BI and other dependent central banks, but not enough to fit into the classifications warranting the 
next integer.  The intent is nonetheless ordinal. 
iv
 That is not to deny that at other times the NBU has bought debt or refused bids because the 
government would not accept the interest rate that the debt market would bear at that time. 
v
 That does not preclude, of course, the use of categorical or dummy variables in regression so that 
one can obtan conditional differences in means. 
vi
 There are eight countries for which there are two subperiods after reform of the central bank 
law, so these means are for a set of 34 time periods of varying length.  See CMN, Table A4; the means I 
offer skip the first subperiod in every case. 
vii
 Mongolia is excluded because CMN have no inflation data, and Poland after the second central 
bank law is excluded because there is no information on price liberalization. 
viii
 One might wish to argue that the price liberalization measures should be included in the 
principal components analysis.  It turns out that those data are mostly orthogonal to the central bank 
attributes, and it makes little difference whether they are included or excluded. 
ix
 For the purposes of this paper, the following countries are listed as inflation targeters as of 2004:  
Australia, Brazil, Canada, Chile, Columbia, Czech Republic, Hungary, Iceland, Israel, Korea, Mexico, New 
Zealand, Norway, Poland, South Africa, Sweden, Thailand and the United Kingdom. I would also include 
the European Central Bank. 
x
 There is also a practical consideration.  Using a classification scheme for consensus views with 
verbs like “set” or “ensure” are straightforward.  Either price stability is the sole goal or it is not; either the 
CB has final authority over monetary policy or it does not.  “Curtail” is a different matter.  We can curtail 
without eliminating entirely, so deciding whether one has curtailed is a judgment call.  This reintroduces 
the same arbitrariness that I have faulted in the CWN and GMT indices.   
xi
 In terms of the CWN measure, they state price stability is a primary objective if the central 
bank’s score on the CWN table is greater than or equal to 0.4.   
xii
 The Bank of England is stranger yet. It is told to pursue price stability and “subject to that”, 
pursue policies to support government goals for economic growth and employment.  It also has a 
memorandum of understanding with the government to provide for stability of the monetary system and the 
financial system (particularly regarding the payments system), and to provide oversight for the financial 
system more generally. 
xiii
 Again, in terms of the CWN measure, I would count only those central banks with values of 
0.8 or 1 as holding the upper hand in conflicts. 
xiv
 On the website that complements this book, you can find a longer list of other central banks.   
                                                                                                                                                 
xv
 The dual mandate of the Swiss National Bank may be less known.  Article 5, section 1 states 
“The National Bank shall pursue a monetary policy serving the interests of the country as a whole. It shall 
ensure price stability. In so doing, it shall take due account of the development of the economy.”  I am not 
interpreting the words “In so doing” as providing the same degree of subsidiarity in policy objectives as I 
have described elsewhere. 
xvi
 Another way to think of this is whether a central bank that has the upper hand in policy 
conflicts with the government and instrument independence is any less “weight conservative” in the Rogoff 
(1985) or Svensson (1997) sense than a central bank with those qualities and a stated sole goal for price 
stability.  Such banks may nonetheless have the ability and incentive to smooth output or interest rate 
fluctuations. 
